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Turning  points are  the most  difficult events to predict  in either
economic or human history.  In many areas (the weather, the GNP,
etc.) the naive  statement  that tomorrow  will be like today predicts
as well as most sophisticated models,  except that this naive predic-
tion  system cannot  predict  any turning points.  And  it  is precisely
the  turning  points  that  are  of  interest.  At  the  moment,  we  are
bombarded  with statements that a fundamental long-run economic
turning point is at hand. Energy, the environment,  shortages of raw
materials,  or  something  else  is  going  to  force  us  to  change  our
economic life-styles and institutions dramatically.  Which,  if any, of
these statements  are true?  Or conversely,  what ignored events,  if
any,  might force  fundamental,  but as  yet unrecognized,  changes?
I  have  always  been  intellectually  intrigued  by  turning  points.
We  tend  to  forget  the false,  though  widely  believed,  predictions
about  turning  points.  Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  example  oc-
curred  in the year 1000 when some substantial fraction of the popu-
lation believed that the end of the world was at hand in accordance
with  Biblical prophesies.  But nothing happened  and the whole  in-
cident  is  now  but  a  minor  footnote  in  the  history  of human  mis-
takes.
Even more interesting,  however,  are the actual  turning points.
I  plague  my  historian  friends  with  the question  of whether those
who were alive at the time realized that they were participating in a
turning point.  The usual answer is that they did not. I am told that
even  such  a  dramatic  turning  point  as the  French  revolution  was
not perceived as such for some period of time after what, we would
now all  agree,  was the beginning of the French  revolution.
If we  could  quantify  human  history,  I  suspect  that we  would
find a  very  poor  prediction  record on  turning  points.  We  predict
turning  points that  are  not turning  points,  and we  do  not predict
those that  actually  are  turning points.
SOME PREDICTED  TURNING  POINTS  THAT
ARE NOT  TURNING  POINTS
Trend Toward a  Leisure Society
Many  people  are  predicting  that  with  rising  productivity  and
incomes,  the United  States  will become a leisure  society  and that
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prediction that is slightly out of fashion at the moment, but one that
enjoys  a  recurring  life.  The  only  problem  is  that  it  is  factually
incorrect.  As our productivity  and  incomes  rose,  we used to  take
some of this increasing  productivity  in the form of leisure,  but not
any  longer.  Since the late  1950's,  annual  hours of paid  work have
risen.  From  1960  to  1973  the  average  male  increased  his  annual
hours  of work  from  1,836 to  1,844  hours  per year and the average
woman  increased  her hours of work from  1,168  to  1,296 hours per
year. This  11 percent increase for women,  together with an  18 per-
cent increase in the proportion  who  were working, resulted in a 29
percent increase  in the hours of paid female work  per year.
Analysis  of unpaid  household tasks indicates  that the increase
in paid female work was not matched by an equivalent reduction  in
unpaid work. Women are simply working more hours  per year now
than they did fifteen  years  ago,  and men  have  stopped  their long-
run movement toward  shorter hours of work.  If we  look at men in
the prime working years (25-64),  hours of work  have also gone up
rapidly.  Only  the increase  in  college  enrollments  and  retirements
have  prevented  average  hours of work  from rising rapidly.
At the moment we are  not heading toward  a leisure  society but
toward  a society  that is  more work oriented  than  it has been.  The
reasons  for this movement are not clear, but they include the prob-
ability  that  most  Americans  like  their  work,  that  they  may  find
leisure on the job more fun than leisure at home,  and that they have
discovered  capital  intensive  leisure  activities-second  homes,
power  boats,  etc.  They  want  more  goods  but  less time  for  their
leisure.
Trend Toward a Service  Society  and Economy
Many  people  contend  that  the  United  States  is  becoming  a
service  society  and  economy.  This  prediction  seems  to  be  made
with a considerable  degree of anxiety but without any clear idea of
the horrible consequences  that would follow if it were true.  In  any
case,  what is  actually  happening to  the  economy  is quite  different
from what is implied by the use of the word services. Normally  we
use the  words service indistries to connote personal  service firms
that  are  small-scale  industries  with  low  capital-labor  ratios.  The
official  definition of service  industries,  however,  is everything ex-
cept extractive  industries (agriculture  and mining) and manufactur-
ing.  Thus  it  includes  capital  intensive  industries  such  as  power
companies and many industries such as retail stores that are simply
an integral part of the process of producing and distributing goods.
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substance  of the word  services, the shift  to  services  is  much less
dramatic.  Between  1950 and 1970, the proportion of the labor force
engaged  in producing  and distributing goods actually  rose from 63
to  65  percent  of the total  work  force.  Personal  services,  what  is
normally  meant  when we  use the word services, actually  dropped
from  10.5  percent  to  less  than  9  percent  of the  labor force.  The
growth in services was all  in social services,  which grew from  12 to
22  percent  of the  labor  force.  Within  social  services,  the  health
industry  accounted for  30 percent of the increase,  and the  educa-
tion  industry accounted  for 50 percent of the increase.
As a result, the shift to services narrows  down to the growth of
two  industries,  health  and  education.  Both  of these  are  capital
intensive large industries that are not exactly  what the editorialists
are  referring  to  when  they  talk  about  the  service  economy.  In
addition, the  growth of the education  industry has halted.  Extrac-
tive  industries  have  been  declining,  but  they  have  now  become
such  a small fraction  of the total  labor force  that further  declines
can have  very  little effect  on the economy.
Trend Toward a White  Collar  Society
The  distinction  between  white  and blue  collar jobs has totally
lost significance,  if it ever  was significant.  The  traditional distinc-
tions  were  mental  versus  manual  work,  promotion  possibilities
versus no promotion possibilities,  dirty versus clean, heavy super-
vision  versus  light  supervision.  In  our  classification  system,  a
roomful  of  women  sitting  at  key  punches  wearing  multicolored
shirts  will be classified  as white  collar workers  while  a roomful  of
women  wearing  white coats sitting at an electronics  assembly line
will  be  classified  as  blue  collar  workers.  The  differences  escape
me.
Half of the increase  in  the  proportion  of white  collar workers
from  1950  to  1970  can  be  traced  to  clerical  workers  (typing  is,
however,  a manual  skill),  and the other  half can  be traced  to  pro-
fessional workers. One-third of the latter are school teachers, and a
substantial  fraction  are  health personnel.
The  Energy Crisis and the Nature of Economics
Much  has  been  written  lately  about  the  energy  crisis  and  the
resulting pervasive changes  in the economy.  But this is not really a
turning point. While economic history is to some extent a history of
falling relative  prices for raw materials  and  energy,  that history  is
not without interruption.  The fundamental question is whether we
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or raw materials.  Since the raw materials crisis of a year or two ago
has  faded from view,  and since  it is similar to the energy problem,
let us focus  on energy.
We  need  to  make  two  distinctions  in  evaluating  the  current
energy  "crisis."  First, there  is a difference  between  the short-run
effects of an economy adjusting to a new higher price of energy and
the  long-run effects of that  higher price.  The  short-run  effects  are
created by  our having purchased  durable  items that  we  would not
have purchased  had we  known about  the rising price  of energy.  If
the price of gasoline doubles, the gasoline  bill can be held constant
by buying a car that gets twice the gas mileage.  Someone  who owns
a gas guzzling monster is in trouble, however,  until it comes time to
replace that economically obsolete car with  one more  suited to the
current  price of energy.  While  the  car  adjustment  problem  cures
itself in  five  to  ten  years,  the  housing  adjustment  problem  takes
longer.  If we  had known  the  price of energy,  we  would have built
different  houses-fewer windows, more insulation, etc.-but given
that we have houses geared to cheap energy, we will have enormous
heating  or cooling  bills  if we  maintain our  old life-style.
The importance of this distinction is that a radically  higher price
for energy  creates  short-run  discomforts  and  alters  the  nature  of
the  goods  that we  will  buy in  the  long run,  but  it does not  funda-
mentally  change  the nature  of the economic  system or  its  rate of
growth.  This  is  especially true  since the gross  national  product  is
exactly what the term indicates  it is-a measure  of the gross output
of the economy.  As a result,  higher prices for energy get reflected
in a larger gross national product when a barrel of oil  is produced.
What  is even  more important,  the size of the change  in price of
energy should not be exaggerated.  One of the ways to evaluate  the
real cost of any commodity  is  to look  at  the  working time or frac-
tion  of one's  income  that  has to  be sacrificed  to obtain that  good.
The average  family's gas,  oil,  and utility bills  have certainly  gone
up relative to their income or working time  since  the  Organization
of Petroleum  Exporting Countries got  under way, but the increase
in the  "effort"  price  of energy  should not  be exaggerated.  Given
June  prices,  the  average  family's  effort  cost  of energy  has  been
pushed back to 1970 levels.  Assuming that oil prices will be deregu-
lated  and that OPEC will  raise the  price of oil  by two  dollars per
barrel  this fall,  the average  family's  real  cost of energy  will revert
to  1968  levels.  While  it  is  painful  to  have  the  economic  clock
pushed back five or seven years with respect to any product,  such a
reversal  is hardly  a  disaster,  an  unprecedented  setback  in  human
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tory.
Second,  we need to distinguish  between  changes forced by  na-
ture  and changes forced by men. The current price of energy  is not
something forced  upon us  by nature  and natural  scarcities,  but by
the organization  of a man-made  cartel.  What  man  can make,  man
can break.  Without OPEC we would now be in a period of rapidly
declining  energy  prices  regardless  of what  we  believe  about  the
long-run availabilities  of energy  and the  twenty-first  century.  For
all of these reasons,  I do not think that the current energy crisis is  a
fundamental  turning  point  in  history.
The Education Industry and the  Economy
There  is  no  doubt  that  education  is  now  at  a  turning  point.
Demography  made it the  growth industry of the  1950's and  1960's,
and demography  will make it a declining industry in the second half
of the  1970's  and  the  1980's.  While  those  of us  in  the  education
industry  are going to find it  painful to go from  a growth  industry to
a declining industry, the economy  will  barely notice  the transition.
The decline  of educational  employment  will  be minor in  compari-
son with  the  decline of agriculture  as  an employer.
The economy is also apt to adjust rather smoothly to an increas-
ingly educated  labor force.  Expectations  and  demanded  skills ad-
just so that the economy  will  continue to run even though  its labor
force has  a larger and larger fraction  of college educated  workers.
One of the glories of the U.S.  higher education  system is that it has
not yet started to turn out  large numbers of workers  who refuse  to
take jobs beneath  their dignity.  Expectations  are  usually realistic
and adjust rather rapidly  when the traditional  openings for college
graduates  diminish.
A  TURNING  POINT OF  UNKNOWN  IMPACT
Leaving  aside  the  oil  rich  nations  who  inherited  wealth,  the
United States  has  had the  world's highest  per  capita income  and
standard  of living  for all  of this  century.  Using  foreign  exchange
rates,  it looks as if we have just been passed by Sweden,  Denmark,
and Switzerland  and are about to be passed by West Germany and
Norway. More careful studies using the prices of all goods, not just
internationally  traded  goods,  come  to the  conclusion  that  we  still
have  some  period  of  grace  before  we  are  second  best.  West
Germany's  standard  of living  is  about three-fourths  of that of the
United States and Sweden's may be seven-eighths.  But there is also
no  doubt  that  the  rates  of growth  in  these  countries  have  been
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mately  will catch  up.
The  unknown  is  our  reaction  to  retreating  into  a  second  best
position.  Will it be to change our institutions to accelerate  our rate
of growth  and  maintain  our  position,  or  will  it  be  to  ignore  the
problem  and sink into economic  obscurity like the English? Obvi-
ously,  no  one knows what our reactions  will  be,  but either way,  a
turning point  will  have  been  reached.
If we  decide  to  accelerate  our rate  of growth,  major  changes
will  be  necessary.  Almost  since  the  industrial  revolution  began,
our productivity  has grown at  a rate of slightly  less than 3 percent
per  year.  What  has changed  is  not  our performance,  but  that  of
others.  Ours  has stayed  the same and theirs  has improved.  Given
this long  history  of a  rather constant performance,  there  is every
reason to believe  that fundamental changes  would  be necessary  to
increase  the  U.S.  rate of growth  of productivity.
On the other hand, if we choose not to respond,  a turning point
will also  have been  reached.  After a long period of supremacy,  we
will no  longer be  able to claim  that our economic  system is best at
delivering  the  goods.  Other  economic  systems-most  notably
Sweden-will  be  able  to claim that they deliver both  better short-
run and long-run performances.  Given what we know about human
nature and "low income" countries,  it is clear that sooner or later a
poor relative  economic  performance  creates  political demands  for
change.
CURRENT  ECONOMIC  TENSIONS  AND THEIR
LONG-RUN  IMPLICATIONS
While  I do not believe  that the economy  is at a turning point in
economic  history,  there  are three  current  problems  that  will force
changes  in  our  expectations  or  the  way  in  which  our economy
works. These  are the problems of inflation and unemployment,  the
mix of private and public enterprise,  and an economic time horizon
that  is  longer than our  political  time horizon.
Inflation  and Unemployment
Unfortunately,  inflation  is  endemic  in  our  mode  of economic
production.  We  have  large  and  growing  concentrations  of
economic  power  in both the product market and the labor market.
These  concentrations  of economic  power  can  be  prevented  from
raising  prices  or  wages  by  severely  depressing  the  economy-
that  is,  creating  low  levels  of demand  and  high  levels  of unem-
ployment-but  whenever  the  economy  is  near  capacity,  unions
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than  would  occur  in  a  competitive  economy.  The  nature  of the
problem  can  be  clearly  seen  by  comparing  the  reductions  in  de-
mand  that  are  necessary  to  cause  price  reductions  in  the  auto-
mobile  industry  with  how  easily  the  prices  of farm  commodities
can fall  whenever supplies  rise relative  to  demand.
Economic  power  and  the  capacity  to  raise  prices  and  wages
faster  than would occur  in  a competitive  economy  are  buttressed
by modern fiscal and monetary economics.  All of the major players
in the  economic  game know that the government  is not going to let
the  economy  collapse  no  matter  how  much  they  raise  their  own
wages or prices.  Thus,  in  a very fundamental  sense,  the discipline
of the  market is not present or is very much attenuated.  No matter
how  wisely  or  foolishly  the  government  manipulates  its  macro-
economic  policy instruments,  it  cannot achieve  low  rates of both
inflation  and unemployment.
The  standard  economic  solution  to  this  problem  would  be  to
break  up  the  concentrations  of economic  power  that  cause  the
dilemma  in  the  first  place;  yet  current  economic  discussions  are
marked  by  a  complete  absence  of this  suggestion.  We  feel  that
these large concentrations  of economic  power either contribute  to
the  long-run  growth  of productivity  or are  so  powerful  that  any
attempt  to break them  up would be futile.
Despite the current cases against  IBM and AT&T,  I think it is
clear that the antitrust solution  is intellectually  bankrupt.  Prosecu-
tions  go  on,  but  I  know  of no  one  who  thinks  that  any  of the
economy's problems  will  be solved  even if these prosecutions  are
successful.  The  antitrust effort has  a life  of its own,  but it  is a life
that is now  completely  void of any  intellectual  rationale.  We  have
simply  reached  the  point  where  no  one  thinks  that  the  whole
economy can revert to the competitive  mode that actually exists in
the  agricultural  area.
If we  look  at  democratic  industrial  powers,  it  is  clear  that  no
one has  found  an acceptable  solution to the problem.  As a result,
the  real  questions  revolve  around  finding  ways  to  live  with  the
economy  as  it exists.
Basically there  are  two options.  We  could run the economy at
something approaching  full employment and then find ways to keep
the  resulting  inflation  from  hurting  anyone  too  severely.  Or  we
could  run the  economy  at a level  where  inflation  is not  a  problem
and find ways of keeping the resulting unemployment from hurting
too severely.  In the first case,  we would adopt  some form of index-
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at  very different rates.  And in the second case,  we would use some
form  of  public  employment  to  create  the  full  employment  that
could  not  be  achieved  in  the  private  economy.  Either  solution
would,  however,  substantially  alter  the  nature  of  the  current
economic  system.
There  is  a  third  option  of  doing  what  we  are  now  doing
-running  the economy at unacceptable  levels of both inflation  and
unemployment-but  I assume  that  this  is  an  intolerable  long-run
solution.
The  Mix  of Public  and Private Enterprise
Long  ago,  we  widened  the  scope  of choice  beyond  that  of
socialism versus  capitalism. These are merely ends of a continuum
along which exist a multitude  of choices including the simultaneous
existence  of government and  private corporations  (electric  power
production  and distribution,  parcel  delivery),  regulated  industries,
and joint public-private  enterprises  (Comsat).  The  real problem  is
not to  decide  on  a  superior  method  of organization  for the  entire
economy  but to  decide  which  method  is superior  in different  sec-
tors  of the  economy.  There  is  also  no  reason  to  assume  that  a
superior  method  of organization  will  remain  the  superior  method
for all  time.
The  perfect  example  is the transportation  industry  and the  In-
terstate  Commerce  Commission.  When  the  ICC  was  founded  it
played  an  important  role  in  offsetting the  monopoly  power of the
railroads.  Over time, however, the transportation industry became
a  competitive  industry  with  the  development  of cars,  trucks,  air-
planes,  pipelines,  etc. Yet the regulations  based upon  the assump-
tion of a monopoly continue to exist.  They exist, not as a result of
sloth,  but because  they have  built up a set of vested interests that
benefit  by  their  existence.  The  rationale  has  disappeared,  yet  we
seem  incapable  of changing  the  rules.  The railroads  have deterio-
rated  to  the  point  where  deregulation  cannot  save  them,  but  we
seem incapable  of creative  solutions such  as nationalization  of the
roadbed  and competitive  traffic  on that  roadbed.
The  issue  is  not  regulation  versus  deregulation,  but  starting
regulations  in  some  areas  and  ending  regulations  in  others.  We
seem  unable to  do either.
One of the benefits  of being a defeated power  in a war, such as
West Germany or Japan,  is that all of the economic  institutions are
swept  away  and  have  to  rejustify  their  existence  and  usefulness.
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interests  have  been  destroyed.  The  same  thing  was  true  in  the
Great  Depression.  This  is  not  to  say that  we  should  deliberately
lose  a war,  or have  a Great  Depression,  but we  do need  to find  a
way to  periodically  change our institutional  arrangements.  As yet
we  have  not  found  it.  Our  economic  institutions  have  not  been
significantly altered  in the last three or four decades and are begin-
ning to  show their age.  But  we have  no effective  way to reinvigo-
rate  them.  We  need the  peacetime  equivalent  of a popular  war in
order to get  some  basic changes  in  our institutions.
Economic  and  Political  Time Horizons
At the  moment  the economy  is  facing a set  of problems  where
the time necessary to solve them  is so long that the politicians  who
initiate  the solution would receive  all of the blame for stepping on
economic  toes and receive none of the credit for solving the prob-
lem.  Project  Independence  is  a perfect example.  People often  ask
why something does not happen.  There is an easy answer.  If a set
of projects  for  energy  independence  were  to  actually  be  under-
taken,  they  would dislocate  a number of economic  interests.  Yet
they could not achieve  energy independence  until the late  1980's at
the earliest.  By the late 1980's most, if not all, of the current gener-
ation of politicians  will  have  retired,  voluntarily  or  involuntarily.
Today's  politicians  will be blamed for the dislocations  that  Project
Independence  causes but they can receive  none of the credit.  Still
there is no way to achieve  energy independence in less than fifteen
years.  As a result, we do nothing.  Our economic and political time
horizons  are  simply  out  of joint.  Similar  problems  exist  in  the
transportation industry.
The  solution to this problem  is not at  all  easy to envision.  The
time  necessary to  reach  an economic  solution  cannot be  cut,  and
we do not wish to elect our leaders for life. What we really need  is
leaders who see what must be done, know that it will be unpopular
initially,  and are willing to take the blame and risk defeat with little
chance  of  receiving  any  immediate  credit.  Unfortunately,  these
people either do not exist or are  unelectable  if they  do exist.
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